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Abstract:  
According to Becker (1968) it is best to use very high fines and low inspection probabilities to 
deter traffic accidents because inspection is costly. This paper uses a political economy model 
to analyse the choice of the fine and the inspection probability. There are two lobby groups: 
the vulnerable road users and the ‘strong’ road users. If only vulnerable road users are 
effective in lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car 
drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between inspection probability 
and the magnitude of the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the 
vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. The reverse holds if only the car drivers 
are effective lobbyists. The orders of magnitude are illustrated numerically for speeding and 
contrasted with current fines for drunk driving in the European Union.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to increase road safety, there are different monitoring and enforcement strategies to 
put speed limitations into effect. In general, the public debate emphasises raising the 
probability of detecting speed violations rather than increasing the fines. This observation 
conflicts with economic theory2 that leads to fines set at the highest possible level and 
minimal (costly) monitoring efforts. In Europe, we see at present large variations in the 
magnitude of speeding fines3 and in the probability of detection. Think for example of the 
variation in enforcement strategies to deter drunk driving in the European Union, which is 
shown in the final section. 
In this paper we look at the forces behind the monitoring and enforcement decisions for 
speeding. We see public policy as the outcome of a political process that is influenced by 
lobbying efforts of different interest groups. As an example, we mention the debate triggered 
by the reform of the enforcement of speed violations in Belgium (March 2006). Several 
interest groups held conflicting views as illustrated by the following (translated) newspaper 
headlines: 
 
“The auto lobby is too aggressive” according to the Association of Parents of Road Traffic Victims 
(De Morgen, 29 March 2006) 
“Unjust, these excessive fines. They were ‘draconic measures’.” according to the Flemish Automobile 
Association (De Morgen, 29 March 2006) 
“It is perfectly defendable to limit high fines. On condition that more resources are spend on an 
efficient enforcement policy.” E. Glorieux, Green political party (De Standaard, 31 March 2006) 
 
We can therefore wonder whether interest groups can influence monitoring and enforcement 
policies. In the model of Dixit ea (1997) several principals (lobbyists) simultaneously try to 
control the actions of an agent (policy maker) by promising contributions in return for policy 
favours. Dixit ea (1997) apply the model to income taxation, while Aidt (1998) uses the 
model to analyse environmental policy. There might also be other reasons why policy makers 
opt for high monitoring efforts and low fine levels rather than the theoretically optimal high 
fines and low inspection probabilities. One can, for instance, use a model of voter behaviour 
like Barro (1973). Recently, Makowsky and Stratmann (2007) study the political economy 
determinants of traffic fines. They empirically estimate the influence of the incentives faced 
                                                 
2 See for example Becker (1968), Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and Shavell (2004) 
3 European Commission (2004) 
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by police officers and their vote maximizing principals on speeding tickets. Their findings 
indeed show that the size of the violation is not the sole determinant of the fine and that it is 
also determined by the police officers’ objective functions. 
In this paper, we use the common agency model4 of Dixit ea (1997) to understand the 
influence of different lobby groups. We only take two categories of individual agents into 
account: vulnerable road users and strong road users. First, we analyse the preferred expected 
fine, i.e. the optimal combinations of the inspection frequency and the magnitude of the fine. 
The socially optimal combinations serve as a benchmark. This benchmark is then compared to 
two lobbying equilibriums: first, when the vulnerable road users form the only effective lobby 
group and, secondly, when the strong road users get all the lobbying weight. We argue that 
vulnerable road users opt for a higher expected fine than is socially optimal because, in our 
model, they bear all the accident losses. The strong road users, on the other hand, prefer a 
very low expected fine since they have to pay the fines and see none of the benefits associated 
with an increase in traffic safety. Next, we determine numerically the optimal combination of 
the inspection and fine parameters when the expected fine is kept fixed. In that case, we find 
that vulnerable road users opt for high fines and a low probability of detection, while strong 
road users prefer a high probability of detection and low fines. The main explanation for these 
findings is that increasing the inspection probability is costly for society as a whole, while 
increasing the fine has no social costs and only affects the car drivers that violate the speed 
limit.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we use lobby groups to understand 
the level of the expected fine as well as the choice between the inspection probability and the 
level of the fine. Second, we incorporate imperfect compliance into the lobbying model. 
Section two presents the theoretical model. Section three presents a numerical illustration of 
the factors at work. Section four concludes. 
 
2. MODEL 
The model under consideration focuses on the level of the expected fine and the trade-off 
between higher fines and a higher probability of detection, but it can also be used to analyse 
other safety policy options such as road safety investments. We examine different 
                                                 
4 This model of interest groups’ influence is based on the common agency model of Bernheim and Winston 
(1986). Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide an excellent introduction to the theoretical literature on interest 
group politics. 
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combinations of inspection frequency and fines and use the political weight of different 
interest groups to explain the variations in the monitoring and enforcement policy that are 
selected by the policy makers. 
 
2.1. Assumptions 
We assume that there are three economic agents:  
- Vulnerable road users (v): children, pedestrians, bicyclists. These individuals are 
homogenous and have an identical value of time. 
- Strong road users (c): car or truck drivers who prefer higher speeds to lower ones. 
They differ with respect to their valuation of time and are therefore heterogeneous. 
- The government, who can take the revenue of the fines, cost of enforcement, social 
costs of accidents and private cost of driving into account. 
The total population N  consists of vN  vulnerable road users and cN  car drivers with 
v cN N N= + . We assume that car drivers are risk averse in their income. Polinsky and 
Shavell (1979) discuss the impact of risk aversion on the trade-off between the probability 
and the level of the fine5. Contrary to Becker (1968), the optimal fine level is shown to be 
lower than the maximal fine in the presence of risk averse individuals and measurement 
errors. 
Car drivers are subject to an exogenously given6 speed limit s . They drive at speed s such 
that their utility is maximised. If drivers exceed the speed limit, they are caught with 
probability π . This probability of detection does not depend on the probability of having an 
accident7 nor on the magnitude of the violation. As a case in point, speed cameras are not 
more likely to film a driver at 120 km/h than one driving at 100 km/h. The costs of 
                                                 
5 Bar-Ilan (2000) has also considered the risk attitude of road users in order to analyse the behaviour of red light 
runners. Red light runners are shown to be risk lovers and this explains why they are not deterred by the high 
expected damages (injuries or even death) combined with the low probabilities of having these damages. 
6 Graves ea (1989) model the policy choice between speed limits and the probability of detection. They show 
that raising the level of policing is likely to have a lower social cost, at the margin, than lowering the speed 
limits. 
7 It would be more correct to use ( )[ ] ( ) [ ]1 ( ) ( )(1 )p s p s p sπ π π π≡ − + = + −%  instead of π . π%  means that with 
probability ( )( )1 p s−  the car driver is not involved in an accident; then he has probability π  that he has to pay a 
fine if he speeds; with probability p(s) he has an accident and if he then speeded, the probability of a fine equals 
one. If a person does not speed, 0π π= =%   
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enforcement consist of a fixed enforcement cost FEC  (for example, the cost of a speed camera) 
and a variable enforcement cost VEC  (for example, the administrative cost of writing a notice 
of violation). The total enforcement cost is thus an increasing and convex function of the 
probability of detection and the number of violators.  
Once violators are caught, they face a fine ( ) ( )F s ff vf s s= + −  with ff  the fixed fine, vf  
the variable fine and 
( )
( )
0
0
F s  if s s
F s  if s s
= ≤ > >
. This fine is increasing with the seriousness of the 
infraction and linear8: ( )' 0F s >  and ( )'' 0F s = .  
 
2.2. Modelling agents’ behaviour 
In this section we discuss the behaviour of the three economic agents: vulnerable and strong 
road users, who are utility maximisers; and the government, which maximises an objective 
function for which we do not specify the origin. We model, using backward induction, the 
road users’ reaction to the selected monitoring and enforcement policy. Next, we determine 
the government’s preferred monitoring and enforcement strategy for a given level of lobbying 
activity and the previously determined reaction functions of the road users. 
 
(a) Vulnerable road user 
We assume that the utility of the vulnerable road users vU  is quasi-linear and determined by 
the consumption of other goods, vx  (price normalised to 1), the number of trips taken, vTR  
(fixed per individual) and the expected accident costs, ( )p s h , with ( )p s  the probability per 
trip of having an accident and h the harm caused by the accident9. Note that, even though the 
harm is independent of speed, the expected harm is not.  
Utility, which is additive in trips and consumption, then equals 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1 0v v v v
v v v
U x TR p s h p s
x TR p s h
γ
γ
 = + − − −   
= + −  
 (1) 
with a constant marginal utility of a trip vγ  for a vulnerable road user. 
                                                 
8 In practice, for example in Belgium, linear fines are often used for speed violation because they are easy to 
communicate and to implement. 
9 Assuming that vulnerable road users are risk averse to harm does not change the results qualitatively.  
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The vulnerable road user maximises his utility with respect to his budget constraint 
 v vx Y L≤ +  (2) 
The individual’s consumption of other goods must be smaller than the sum of the 
exogenously given income vY  and the lump sum transfer L
10. 
This gives us the expression for the indirect utility 
 ( )V v v vV Y L TR p s hγ= + + −    (3) 
 
(b) Strong road user 
The strong road users differ in their value of time [ ]1 2t t ,t∈  and will, therefore, not all drive at 
the same speed. We assume that the value of time is continuously, uniformly distributed with 
probability density 
2 1
1
t t−  and cumulative distribution 
1
2 1
t t
t t
−
− .  
The utility cU  of the strong road users is determined by their consumption of other goods, cx  
(price equal to 1), the constant11 number of trips they take, cTR , the constant marginal utility 
of a trip, cγ , the time cost of making the trip ( ),TC t s (with 
2
20, 0, 0
T T T
C C C
t s t
∂ ∂ ∂> < =∂ ∂ ∂  and 
2
2 0
T
C
s
∂ >∂ ) and the disutility ( )( )aR F s  of risking to pay a fine per trip12: 
 ( ) ( )( ), ac c c c c T cU x TR TR C t s TR R F sγ π= + − −  (4) 
In order to implement the model of Dixit ea (1997), a quasi-linear utility function is assumed 
and the car driver is only risk averse with respect to the fine payments. We assume that the 
disutility of the fine takes a quadratic form 
 ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( )
2
a a c
cR F s F s F s
βα= +  (5) 
                                                 
10 We normalise the cost of taking a trip as a vulnerable road user to zero.  
11 If the number of trips is not constant then it depends also on the value of time. This assumption does not really 
affect our insights. 
12 We assume that the strong road users do not incur any accident losses. This can be considered as a 
normalisation since in accidents between strong and vulnerable road users, the losses of the strong road user will 
be negligible.  
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The car driver maximises his utility with respect to his budget constraint. The private 
monetary cost of driving ( )MC s  is a function of the speed s  the driver selects. The private 
monetary costs include the resource cost and the fuel cost with MC
s
∂
∂ ≤ 0 and 
2
2 0
MC
s
∂ ≥∂ . The 
budget restriction thus equals13: 
  ( ) ( )c c M cx Y L F s C s TRπ≤ + − +        (6) 
The car driver’s indirect utility then takes the following form: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )c c c c T MV Y L TR C t,s C s R F sγ π = + + − − −    (7) 
With ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2 21 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
a a c c
c cR F s F s R F s F s F s F s F s
β βα α ≡ + = + + ≡ +  . 
The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion for the fine equals 
''
'
Vr
V
= −  and thus 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2
2
c
c c c
c
c c
V TR F s
F s
V TR
F s
π α β
πβ
∂ = − +  ∂
∂ = −∂
 
Assuming risk aversion, ( ) 0cc cr F s
β
α β= − >+ , imposes two conditions on the parameters cα  
and cβ 14: 
 ( )0 cc
c
and F sαβ β< >−   (8) 
We also know that, if car drivers are risk averse, they prefer a high probability of detection 
combined with a lower fine to a lower probability and a higher fine with the same expected 
value (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970 and 1971). 
We use a two-stage approach to model the strong road users’ individual reaction to the 
monitoring and enforcement policy adopted by the policy maker. In the first stage, the driver 
decides whether to comply with the speed limit or not. The decision variable is ( )z t , which is 
                                                 
13 In this model we normalise the private accident costs to zero. The results of the analysis will not change 
qualitatively as long as strong road users do not fully internalise total accident costs. In general, people do not 
take into account the full accident costs due to, among other things, insurance, judgement proof issues or the 
underestimation of the probability of being involved in an accident. 
14 We assume that the second condition can be met since, in practice, speed has an upper limit and therefore the 
possible fine that can be imposed is also limited. 
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one if the driver is in violation and zero if he is compliant. In the second stage, the driver 
decides on the speed s that he will drive.  
Using backward induction, we first calculate the level of speed for a given compliance 
decision. If car drivers comply ( )( )0z t = , their private optimal speed os  is below or equal to 
the speed limit. An interior solution sˆ  is defined by  
 ( ) ( )
0
0T Mc
z
C s,t C sV
s s s=
∂ ∂∂ = + =∂ ∂ ∂  
Hence, the private optimal speed ( )os t , given that the driver complies, is given by  
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
0 0
o
ˆ         if  s t  
ˆ ˆs t s t      if  0 s t s
ˆs         if  s t s
<= ≤ ≤ >
 (9) 
The first order condition for drivers, who decide to ignore the speed limit ( )( )1z t = , 
determines ˆˆs : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
0T Mc c
z
T M
R F sC s,t C sV TR
s s s s
R F sC s,t C s
s s s
π
π
=
 ∂∂ ∂∂ = − − − = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
∂∂ ∂⇒ + = −∂ ∂ ∂
 (10) 
The private optimal speed ( )( )ˆˆ, , max ,oo oos s t F s sπ  ≡ =    is determined by equating the 
marginal benefit to the marginal cost of driving faster. The marginal benefit is the reduction in 
private costs of driving one km/h faster. The marginal cost represents the disutility of the 
expected change in the fine due to the increase in speed. 
Using these results, we now turn to the driver’s compliance decision. A driver speeds if the 
following condition is met: 
 
1 0
( ) 1 if 0  with c cz zz t D D V V= == > = −  (11) 
The driver will speed if the utility of complying is lower than the benefit of violating and 
risking the fine. There exists a certain value of time for which drivers are indifferent between 
speeding or not ( )0D = . This cut-off point t% is a function of π and ( )F s  and is defined by 
the equality of the net driving cost without speeding (speed 0s ) and the net driving cost of 
speeding (speed 00s ) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , 0o o oo oo ooT M T MC t s C s C t s C s R F sπ   + − + − =   % %  (12) 
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Given that the value of time is uniformly distributed, we know that a proportion 1
2 1
t t
t t
−
−
%
 of the 
cN  strong road users comply and a proportion 2
2 1
t t
t t
−
−
%
 speed.  
We show the speed decision in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis we denote the speed level and 
on the vertical axis the marginal costs and benefits. The upward sloping curve (dashed line) is 
the marginal cost of speeding and the downward sloping curves represent the marginal 
benefits for each value of time. People with a value of time 1t t< %  comply with the speed 
limit, while people with a value of time such as 2t t> %  speed.  
 
Figure 1: The speed decision of the car drivers 
 
 
(c) Government 
The government receives the net fine revenues (probability of detection times the fine times 
the number of offences minus the cost of enforcement) and uses this revenue to give a lump 
sum L to all road users N.  
 ( )( )2
2 1
( )
E E
t
V Fc
c
t
N TR F s t C dt C L N
t t
π − − =− ∫%  (13) 
Rewriting (12) gives the following expression for the lump sum transfer 
s  
/MB MC  
MC  
( )MB t%  
( )2MB t  
( )0 1s t  ( )00 2s t  s  
( )1MB t  
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( )( )2
2 1
( )
E E
t
V Fc
c
t
N TR F s t C dt C
t t
L
N
π − −−=
∫
%  (14) 
Note that individuals, when they decide to speed or not, do not perceive the influence of the 
fine they pay on the lump sum transfer, because there is a large number of car drivers cN . 
Following Dixit ea (1997), we assume that the outcome of the lobbying game can be 
represented by the maximum of a function that equals a weighted sum of a social welfare 
function (representing the pure political process before lobbying) and the utility functions of 
the lobbying groups.  
 ( ) ( ) [ ]1 1v v c cOBJ , SWF N V N Vθ λ θ θ λ λ= + − + −    (15) 
 
The weights ( )andθ λ  are determined by the lobbying game. If 1θ = , lobbying has no 
influence on the policy decision and the regulator selects the monitoring and enforcement 
strategy that maximises social welfare. If 0θ = , only lobbies matter and then the parameter 
λ  determines the relative power of each lobby group. In this paper we assume that the 
outcome of the purely political process (SWF) corresponds to the maximum of an additive  
utilitarian social welfare function15. 
In the next section, we determine analytically the socially optimal probability of detection and 
the associated fine function. In the following section, we numerically calculate these 
parameters. Moreover we also numerically analyse the choice between the probability of 
detection and the fine function when the expected fine is given.  
 
3. THE OPTIMAL FINE FUNCTION AND PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 
We first consider the benchmark case, where the government simply maximises the objective 
function (14) with respect to the probability of detection π , the fixed fine ff  and the variable 
fine vf  in the absence of any lobby groups ( )1θ = . Next, we examine two extreme lobbying 
equilibriums: one where the vulnerable road users have all the lobbying weight 
( )0,  1θ λ= = and one where only the utility of the strong road users is taken into account 
                                                 
15 We can take other assumptions but this would require us to model more finely the working of the political 
process itself. 
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( )0,  0θ λ= = . We show in what direction interest groups want to influence the monitoring 
and enforcement strategy.  
 
(a) Benchmark: 1θ =   
In the benchmark, there are no lobby groups and we assume that this results into the 
maximisation of an additive utilitarian social welfare function. This implies that the utility of 
each individual has the same weight. 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
1
1
2
2 1
2 1
2 1
tt
c
v v c c v v c c
t t
V v v v
t
c
c c c T M
t
t
c
c c c T M
t
NSWF N V N V N V V comply dt V speed dt
t t
N Y L TR p s h
N Y L TR C t,s C s dt
t t
N Y L TR C t,s C s R F s dt
t t
γ
γ
γ π
 = + = + + −   
 = + + −   
 + + + − −   −
  + + + − − −  −
∫ ∫
∫
∫
%
%
%
%
 (16) 
Using Leibnitz’ rule and restricting ourselves to a linear fine function, we calculate the 
derivatives of social welfare with respect to π , ff  and vf . These first order conditions form 
a system of three equations and three unknowns. 
The first order condition for the inspection frequency is: 
 
( )
( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2
decreased accident cost
2 1
2
change trip costs
( , )
2
v v
MT
t
c
c
t
dp s
N h TR
d
dC sdC t s
d d
dSWF N dsTR ff vf s s vf dt
d t t d
ff vf s s ff vf s s
π
π π
π α βπ π
βα
 −  
 − −    = + − + + −  −     − + − + + −    
∫
%
144424443
144444444444244444 3
( )( )2
2 1
changein government revenues from fines
0
E E
t
V Vc
c
t
N ds dtTR ff vf s s vf C dt C
t t d d
π ππ π
           =          + + − + − −    −     
∫
%
444444
%
1444444444442444444444443
(17) 
 
Using expression (10), we have: 
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( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2
2
decreased accident cost
2
2 1
disutility fine
2 1
2
E E
v v
t
c
c
t
t
V Vc
c
t
dp s
N h TR
d
N TR ff vf s s ff vf s s dt
t t
N ds dtTR ff vf s s vf C dt C
t t d d
π
βα
π ππ π
 −  
  + − + − + + −  −   
  + + − + − −  −  
∫
∫
%
%
144424443
1444444444442444444444443
%
changein government revenues from fines
0 s s
        = ∀ ≥         1444444444442444444444443
 
The socially optimal probability of detection is determined by equating the marginal cost of 
increasing the probability to the associated marginal benefit. The marginal benefit equals the 
decrease in accident cost. If π  increases for given vf  and ff , the speed on the roads 
decreases and thus the expected accident costs decrease. The marginal cost equals the 
disutility of the fine. However, the change in government revenue is uncertain because two 
opposite effects play. Firstly, due to the relative increase in the expected fine, there are fewer 
speeders, the chosen speed is lower and the variable enforcement costs are higher. Hence 
government revenue decreases (a cost). On the other hand, additional revenue is created 
because the expected fine is higher and, because there are less speeders, the variable 
enforcement costs decrease (a benefit).  
Next, the fixed fine is determined by the following expression: 
 
( )
( )
( )( )
2
decreased accident cost
2 1
change in trip costs
2
2 1
( , )
E
v v
MT
t
c
c
t
Vc
c
dp s
N h TR
dff
dC sdC t s
dff dffdSWF N TR dt
dff t t dsff vf s s vf
dff
N dtTR t t C
t t
π α β
π
 −  
 − −  = +  −  − + + −    
+ − −−
∫
%
144424443
144444444424444444443
%%
change in government revenues from fines
0
dff
         =             1444442444443
 (18) 
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Note that the change in the trip costs equals zero (cf. equation (10)). Hence, the socially 
optimal ff  is determined by equating the change in government revenue to the decrease in 
accident costs.  
 ( ) 2
2 1
changein government revenues from finesdecreased accident cost
0
E
Vc
v v c
dp s N dtN h TR TR t t C s s
dff t t dff
π
     − + − − = ∀ ≥    −     
%%
1444442444443144424443
 
The socially optimal variable fine vf  is determined in a similar way as the fixed fine ff . 
 ( ) ( )2
2 1
decreased accident cost changein government revenues from fines
0
E
t
Vc
v v c
t
dp s NdSWF dtN h TR TR s s dt C s s
dvf dvf t t dff
π
     = − + − − = ∀ ≥   −       
∫
%
%
144424443 144444424444443
  (19) 
The three monitoring and enforcement parameters are determined by equating the marginal 
cost to the marginal benefits. The exact magnitudes of vf , ff and π  depend on the way the 
speed decisions react to the change in the probability of detection, the change in the fixed fine 
or the change in the variable fine. These reactions depend on the degree of risk aversion.  
Note that we cannot guarantee a unique solution. Several combinations of vf , ff and π  will 
have the same effect on drivers’ compliance and are therefore indistinguishable. This scenario 
serves as a benchmark. 
 
(b) 0θ =  and only the vulnerable road users lobby counts: 1λ =  
When the government only takes the utility of the vulnerable road users into account, the 
objective function equals 
 (0,1) v vOBJ N V=  (20) 
The optimal probability of detection is then determined by 
 
( )(0,1) 0  0  v v vdp sdOBJ dLN N h TRd d dπ π π
 = ⇒ + − =  
 (21) 
 
( )
( )( )2
decreased accident cost
2 1
changein government revenues from fines
0
E E
v v
t
V Vv c
c
t
dp s
N h TR
d
N N ds dtTR ff vf s s vf C dt C
N t t d d
π
π ππ π
  −     ⇒ =    + + − + − −    −     
∫
%
144424443
%
1444444444442444444444443
   (22) 
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For a vulnerable road user, the marginal benefits of improved monitoring are the reduction in 
accident costs and the (possible) increase in fine revenues of which she receives a share vN
N
 
without having to pay them. The marginal costs of increased control are the higher monitoring 
costs. So the vulnerable road users do not take any effects on the private cost of the strong 
road users into account. 
The fixed fine that is preferred by the vulnerable road users is determined by: 
( )
2
2 1
changein government revenues from finesdecreased accident cost
(0,1) 0
E
Vv c
v v c
dp s N NdOBJ dtN h TR TR t t C s s
dff dff N t t dff
π
     = − + − − = ∀ ≥    −     
%%
1444442444443144424443
 
This expression is very similar to the social optimum, except that only part of the change in 
government revenue is taken into account.  
The variable fine in this scenario is found by solving: 
( ) ( ) ( )2
2 1
decreased accident cost changein government revenues from fines
0,1
0
E
t
Vv c
v v c
t
dOBJ dp s N N dtN h TR TR s s dt C s s
dvf dvf N t t dff
π
     = − + − − = ∀ ≥   −       
∫
%
%
144424443 144444424444443
 
Again we find a similar expression as for the social optimum but with only part of the change 
in government revenue taken into account. 
  
(c) 0θ =  and only the strong road users lobby counts: 0λ =  
In this scenario, the government only cares about the strong road users. The objective function 
then equals 
 (0,0) c cOBJ N V=  (23) 
The optimal probability of detection is derived from 
 (0,0) 0 dOBJ
dπ =  
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2
2
2
2 1
distutility fine
2 1
changein government revenues from fines
2
E E
t
c
c
t
t
V Vc c
c
t
N TR ff vf s s ff vf s s dt
t t
N N ds dtTR ff vf s s vf C dt C
N t t d d
βα
π ππ π
  − + − + + −  −   
⇒   + + − + − −   −   
∫
∫
%
%
1444444444442444444444443
%
144 2
0 s s
     = ∀ ≥      444444444 444444444443
(24) 
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The possible benefit to the strong road users of more inspections is the change in government 
revenue, while the cost consists of the disutility of the fine. The strong road users do not take 
any effect on the accident costs into account and they only consider part of the enforcement 
cost and the government revenues. In order to determine the fine parameters, ff  and vf , they 
only take part of the change in government revenue into account. Thus the first order 
conditions for the fixed and variable fine parameters are: 
2
2 1
changein government revenues from fines
(0,0) 0
E
Vc c
c
dOBJ N N dtTR t t C s s
dff N t t dff
π
   = − − = ∀ ≥  −     
%%
14444424444443
 
( )2
2 1
changein government revenues from fines
(0,0) 0
E
t
Vc c
c
t
dOBJ N N dtTR s s dt C s s
dvf N t t dff
π
    = − − = ∀ ≥ −    
∫
%
%
14444444244444443
 
 
(d) Discussion 
In order to compare the solutions preferred by the vulnerable and strong road users with 
respect to the probability of detection and the level of the fine, we need to distinguish two 
cases. In the first case, when the monitoring and enforcement policy is strengthened, the 
change in government revenue is positive or, in other words, the lump sum distributed to the 
individuals increases; in the second case the change in government revenue is negative and 
thus the level of the lump sum transfer decreases (and can even be negative if the cost of 
enforcement is higher than the fine revenue).  
Concentrating on the probability of detection, we find that the social optimum value is higher 
than the probability of detection preferred by the strong road users if the government budget 
grows. The ordering with respect to the vulnerable road user is undetermined. For the fixed 
and the variable fine, we find that the social optimum value is always higher than the fine 
preferred by the vulnerable and the strong road user. A sufficient condition for the fixed fine 
preferred by the vulnerable road users to be higher than the one chosen by the strong road user 
is.  
2
2 1
E
Vc v c
v v c
dp N N N dtN h TR TR t t C
d N t t d
ππ π
−     > − −     −     
%% ,  
This is, the marginal benefit curve for the vulnerable road user is higher than that for the 
strong user. The condition for the variable fine is analogous.  
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In the second case, if the government revenue is decreasing, the probability of detection, the 
fixed and the variable fine preferred by the vulnerable road users are higher than the social 
optimal one. The ordering with respect to the strong road users’ preference is undetermined.  
In the next section we specify the different functions so that numerical simulations can help in 
ranking the different solutions preferred by the distinct interest groups. 
 
4. NUMERICAL EXERCISE - ILLUSTRATION 
We illustrate the theoretical analysis by means of a numerical example and investigate the 
impact of lobbying activity on the selection of monitoring and enforcement parameters for 
speed limitations for two scenarios. In the first case ,   and ff vfπ  can be set freely, in the 
second the expected fine is fixed. After mentioning the underlying assumptions, this section 
describes and discusses the results. 
 
4.1. Assumptions 
We consider interurban roads in Belgium where the current speed limit is 90 km/h. Table 1 
summarizes the assumptions we make with respect to the proportion of vulnerable road users, 
the number of trips they make on an average day, the utility of a trip and their income per day.  
Table 1: Trip parameters 
 Prop. of 
Population 
# Trips 
/day 
Utility (€) 
/trip 
Income (€) 
/day 
Vulnerable road users 0,234 0,8 5,9 50 
Strong road users 0,766 2,2 35 50 
  Source: Toint ea (2001), own calculations 
The private cost of driving a car equals the sum of the resource cost, the fuel cost and the time 
cost. The resource cost comprises the purchase cost, the insurance, the maintenance, etc. We 
assume that it is independent of the level of speed and equal to 0,23551 Euro/km16. The fuel 
cost depends on the fuel price and fuel use. Both elements depend on the type of fuel. We 
assume that 49% of the cars drive on gasoline and 51% on diesel17. The price of diesel equals 
                                                 
16 Own calculations based on De Borger and Proost (1997). 
17 NIS 2005 Website 
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1,141 Euro/litre and the price of gasoline equals 1,415 Euro/litre18. The fuel use depends on 
the fuel type and the speed. The different functions are given in Table 2 where s  is the speed 
in km/h. 
Table 2: Fuel use 
Fuel type Speed range Fuel use (l/km) 
Diesel 10-130 km/h 20,1377779 0,00242356 0,000016279 s s− +
Gasoline 80-130 km/h 0,0395757 0,0006365 s+  
  MEET project (1998), International Energy Agency (2002) 
The time cost equals the value of time divided by the level of speed. We consider fifteen 
values of time ranging from 4 Euro/hour to 40 Euro/hour and assume that these values are 
uniformly distributed among the strong road users.  
The expected accident cost equals the harm times the accident risk. For the harm caused by a 
serious accident we use a value of 2.000.000 Euro. Using the data from the FOD Economics 
(2006), we calculate the accident risk ( )( )p s  per km for accidents between vulnerable and 
strong road users, taking into account the influence of speed on the accident risk19. We use the 
following expression: 
 
3
( ) = 0,000002154*
speed limit
sp s      (25) 
We assume that the cost of enforcement takes the following form 
 ( ) 22
2 1
20500 410E c
t tC N
t t
π π−= + −
%
 (26) 
with the fixed enforcement cost equal to 20500 Euro and the variable enforcement costs equal 
to 410 Euro times the number of violators. 
Remember that we use the following structure for speeding fines 
 ( ) ( 90)F s ff vf s= + −  (27) 
This means that if you speed you pay a fixed fine of ff Euro and an additional fine vf per km/h 
over the speed limit.  
 
                                                 
18 www.petrolfed.be 
19 Elvik ea (2000) provides a formula which relates the accident risk to the speed.  
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4.2. Results and discussion 
In this exercise, we first determine the probability of detection π, the fixed fine ff and the 
variable fine vf  when all variables can be set freely. Secondly, we determine these 
parameters for a given expected fine function. In the two cases the optimal monitoring and 
enforcement parameters are calculated for three different scenarios: (i) the benchmark ( )1θ = , 
(ii) the vulnerable road users’ utility function is maximised ( )0 1andθ λ= =  and (iii) the 
strong road users’ utility function is maximised ( )0 0andθ λ= = .  
In the first setting, when the variables can be set freely, we use a heuristic approach to find the 
different optima and calculate the objective functions for 2800 different combinations of the 
three variables under the following conditions: 
 
0,0001 0,2501
0 75
0,0001 30,0001
ff
vf
π≤ ≤
≤ ≤
≤ ≤
 
Table 3 shows the results for this scenario. As expected, we find that the vulnerable road users 
opt for a solution where the number of speeders is minimised whereas the strong road users 
opt for the minimal expected fine. The social optimum lies in between. When there are more 
vulnerable road users, the social optimum will involve a solution with fewer speeders than in 
this example. Note that in this example the solutions for the strong road users and the social 
optimum are unique – this is not the case for the solution favoured by the vulnerable road 
users. This makes sense because different combinations ensure that all comply. 
 
 Table 3: Preferred policies 
 No lobby Lobbying only by 
vulnerable road users 
Lobbying only by 
strong road users 
π /trip 0,0001 0,0101 0,0001 
vf (€) 30,0001 6,0001 0,0001 
ff (€) 45 0 0 
SWF (€) 90.178 90.175 90.040 
# speeders (%) 73,3 0 93,3 
   Own calculations. 
 19
Next we look at the speeding decisions made be car drivers. As expected, the chosen speed 
level rises if the driver’s value of time increases (see Table 4). We also see that the selected 
monitoring and enforcement policy can drastically reduce the number of violators. In the 
private optimum without enforcement 93,3 % of the car drivers violate the speed limit, while 
no one does so under the policy favoured by the vulnerable road users. The social optimum 
still allows 73 percent of the drivers to speed despite the risk of accident. 
 
Table 4: Speed decision in benchmark 
Value of 
time (€/h) 
Private optimal 
speed (no 
enforcement) 
Speed 
(enforcement= 
social optimum) 
Speed  
(enforcement as 
preferred by 
vulnerable users) 
Speed 
(enforcement as 
preferred by  
strong users) 
4 82,31 82,31 82,31 82,31 
7 93,45 90,00 90,00 93,45 
8 96,49 90,00 90,00 96,49 
9 99,31 90,00 90,00 99,31 
10 101,92 96,55 90,00 101,92 
11 104,41 99,13 90,00 104,41 
12 106,74 101,57 90,00 106,74 
14 111,06 106,06 90,00 111,06 
16 115,00 110,16 90,00 115,00 
18 118,64 113,93 90,00 118,64 
20 122,03 117,44 90,00 122,03 
25 129,65 125,31 90,00 129,65 
30 136,34 132,19 90,00 136,34 
35 142,33 138,36 90,00 142,33 
40 147,80 143,98 90,00 147,80 
Own Calculations 
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In the second scenario, we use non-linear programming in order to select the monitoring and 
enforcement parameters that maximise the different objective functions under the restriction 
of a constant expected fine function. Following Polinsky and Shavell (2000), the expected 
fine function is determined exogenously as the sum of the change in the expected harm plus 
the variable enforcement cost. Remember that we can not calculate a unique socially optimal 
expected fine function. This is 
 ( ) ( )( ) * ( ) 90F s p s harm s veπ = ∆ ⋅ ⋅ − +  (28) 
The results are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Preferred policies when the expected fine is fixed 
 No lobby Lobbying only for 
vulnerable road users 
Lobbying only for 
strong road users 
π /trip 0,0677 0,04 0,54 
vf (€) 1,29 2,18 0,16 
ff (€) 590 1000 73 
SWF (€) 90.160 90.160 90.160 
# speeders (%) 0 0 0 
Own Calculations 
 
This illustration corresponds with the second case discussed for the theoretical model. In line 
with our expectations, we indeed see that the strong road users opt for a lower fine function 
and a higher probability of detection than the vulnerable road users. After all, the strong road 
users are the only drivers to pay the fines while the burden of increasing the inspection 
probability is shared with the vulnerable road users. Without lobbying, the social optimum 
lies, as expected, in between these two extremes.  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the context of road safety and more specifically speed limits, we develop a model that 
represents the preferences of different lobby groups. In the model, the lobby groups can select 
different combinations of inspection probability and fine level. We show – both theoretically 
and numerically - that, in general, vulnerable road users (cyclists, pedestrians) prefer a higher 
expected fine than strong road users (car and truck drivers). If we focus on the choice between 
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the magnitude of the fine and the inspection probability for a given fixed expected fine, we 
find that the vulnerable road users prefer a higher fine and a lower inspection frequency than 
the strong road users. This model can not only be used to explain current policy in one 
country but it could also serve to clarify differences in policy between countries or regions. 
As a case in point, traffic safety stands high on the political agenda in Flanders, a region in 
Belgium, and many resources are spent to improve traffic safety. This is less the case in 
Wallonia, another region in the same country. For example, Flanders wants to lower the speed 
limit on interurban roads to 70 km/h, while Wallonia wants to keep the 90 km/h speed limit. A 
possible approach to investigate the variation in regional policies could be, for example, to 
look at the shares of vulnerable and strong road users and the type of enforcement policy in 
place and calculate the correlation coefficient. One could also perform an econometric 
analysis to determine the exact influence of the interest groups. However, there are two 
problems: there are too little observations and information on the probability of detection is 
often lacking. Another illustration is the enforcement strategy chosen by nine European 
countries. Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. shows the average and the maximal 
fines for drunk driving (blood-alcohol level between 0.5 and 0.7) for some European 
Countries. 
 
Figure 1 : Probability of detection and fines for alcohol infractions 
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The percentage of people who have been checked at least once for drunk driving serves as an 
indicator for the probability of detection. We make three observations. Firstly, there is a lot of 
variation in the enforcement strategies. Secondly, in general the fines decrease as the 
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probability of detection increases. In Table 6 we confront the enforcement strategy with the 
relative importance of vulnerable road users. We see that in countries where there are 
relatively many vulnerable road users, the fines are higher and the probability of detection 
lower (except for Germany and the Netherlands). This is our third observation.  
Table 6 : Importance of vulnerable road users 
Country Relative number of km travelled by vulnerable road 
users compared to European average 
Greece 0,6656 
Spain 0,696 
Portugal 0,7568 
France 0,8224 
average 1 
Italy 1,0032 
Austria 1,0208 
Germany 1,16 
Belgium 1,2336 
The Netherlands 2,0736 
Eurostat (2007) 
 
Furthermore, note that the analysis is not restricted to the setting of fines and probability of 
inspections for speeding and drunk driving. The analysis is also not limited to vulnerable 
versus strong road users. Other types of (road) users such as freight versus passenger 
transport, pedestrians versus cyclist, etc. can be discussed as long as their objective functions 
can be clearly defined. It can also provide additional insights into the political processes that 
determine the monitoring and enforcement strategies for, for example, environmental 
legislation.  
Note that we did not discuss the political process behind the objective function of the 
government as this is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, we did not take into 
account any equity effects the enforcement policy may have; nor did we consider the case 
where all users are – to some extent – risk averse. Finally, we assumed that the fine revenues 
were redistributed in a lump sum fashion. In reality, these revenues are often earmarked. If, 
for example, all revenue is used for investments in traffic safety, this lowers the general 
accident risk and hence creates an additional incentive for the vulnerable road users to set the 
expected fine at revenue maximising levels.  
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